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The quest to understand microfoundations is an effort to understand aggregate economic 
phenomena in terms of the behavior of individual economic entities and their 
interactions. These interactions can involve both market and non-market interactions. The 
quest for microfoundations grew out of the widely felt, but rarely explicitly stated, desire 
to stick to the position of methodological individualism (cf., Agassi (1960, 1975), 
Brodbeck (1958)), and also out of the growing uneasiness among economists in the late 
1950s and 1960s with the co-existence of two subdisciplines, namely microeconomics 
and macroeconomics, both aiming at explaining features of the economy as a whole. 
Methodological individualism, as explained in the entry on the topic, is the view 
according to which proper explanations in the social sciences are those that are grounded 
in individual motivations and their behavior. The urge to make microeconomics and 
macroeconomics compatible can be understood from the perspective of the unity of 
science discussion initiated by the Vienna Circle in the philosophy of science in the 
beginning of the 20th century (cf., Nelson, 1984). 
 
Efforts to understand microfoundations go far beyond the questions that lie at the heart of 
formal aggregation theory, i.e. the analysis of how to map aggregate economic variables 
and relationships back to similar individual variables and relationships that underlie them. 
One crucial issue in the microfoundations literature is the extent to which aggregate 
economic variables and/or relationships exhibit features that are similar to the features of 
individual variables and/or relationships and in particular whether certain features are 
emergent properties at the macro level that do not have a natural counterpart at the 
individual level. An important early example of emergence is the analysis of Schelling 
(1978) on segregation. He shows that segregation in neighborhoods may be an emergent 
property at the micro level that can be viewed as an unintended consequence of the 
individual decisions concerning where to live. 
 
The discussion on emergence shows that there is no reason to assume or expect macro 
behavior to be in any way similar or analogous to the behavior of individual units. In 
order to have “proper” microfoundations in line with methodological individualism, it is 
thus by no means required that aggregate outcomes are represented as if they were the 
outcome of a single agent’s decision problem. On the contrary, the restriction to single 
individual decision problems found in modern macroeconomics is self-imposed and not 
implied by the methodological position of methodological individualism (cf., Kirman, 
1989). In fact, one may argue that the interaction between different, and possibly 
heterogeneous, individual units should be at the core of macroeconomic analysis.  
 
As the quest for “proper” microfoundations has arisen in the debate concerning the 
microfoundations for macroeconomics, this entry’s main focus is on this debate. The 
entry starts with a historical perspective on this debate and continues to discuss new 
classical and new Keynesian approaches to macroeconomics that emerged out of the 
microfoundations debate. The role of equilibrium notions and expectations is discussed in 
a separate section. The entry argues that the microfoundations for macroeconomics 
literature is best understood from the perspective of attempting to make microeconomics 
 3
and macroeconomics compatible with each other. The entry closes with a discussion of 
non-mainstream approaches to microfoundations and more recent approaches to 
microfoundations using the perspective of evolutionary forces and boundedly rational 
behavior. 
 
 
Historical Background to the Microfoundations for Macroeconomics debate 
 
Around the mid-1950s two more or less separate approaches existed to studying 
economy-wide phenomena: general equilibrium theory and (Keynesian) 
macroeconomics. Some of the more important theoretical issues within each of these 
approaches were settled. Existence of a general equilibrium point was proved by Arrow 
and Debreu (1954) and the macroeconomic IS-LM framework was well established 
(following the seminal paper by Hicks (1937)). Of course, some other issues were still to 
be tackled, such as questions related to how to deal with imperfect competition, 
incomplete markets and/or overlapping generations. 
.  
Both approaches explained economy-wide phenomena, but there were important 
differences between the perspectives from which each of them started. Flexible prices 
and market-clearing were at the core of general equilibrium theory; involuntary 
unemployment and effective demand important concepts in macroeconomics. The 
neoclassical synthesis reconciled general equilibrium theory and (Keynesian) 
macroeconomics by giving each of them their own domain of applicability: 
macroeconomics (with its assumption of sticky money wages) gives an accurate 
description of the economy in the short run, while the long-run developments of the 
economy were considered to be adequately described by the general equilibrium 
approach.  
 
From a theoretical point of view this state of affairs was unsatisfactory. One cannot 
simply attribute unemployment to sticky money wages while leaving the theoretical 
structure of general equilibrium theory intact: the imposition of a fixed money wage (or, 
more generally, fixed prices) deeply affects the theory of supply and demand. It was 
natural then to inquire into the relationship between the two approaches, especially given 
that they study the same phenomena. In addition, the generally accepted view was that it 
is the market interaction between many individual agents from which economy-wide 
phenomena result, implying that general equilibrium theory is the more fundamental 
theory of the two. The quest for microfoundations was born. 
 
The rise of interest in microfoundations can also, at least party, be conceived as being 
driven by the perceived failings of important elements of empirical macroeconomics and 
in particular the fact that the Phillips curve turned out to be not a stable relationship that 
can be used for economic policy purposes (see, e.g., Friedman (1968)). Several essays in 
Phelps (1970) are written to reconcile microeconomic theory with the apparent temporary 
trade-off between wages and unemployment embodied in the new interpretation of the 
Phillips curve.  
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New Classical and New Keynesian Economics 
 
One key controversy in the quest for microfoundations is how to explain the widely 
observed phenomenon of unemployment. From a market-clearing perspective, 
unemployment simply means that at the current (real) wage rate people do not want to 
supply more labor to the market. If there is registered unemployment it is thus either of a 
‘voluntary’ nature, or a short-run phenomenon that quickly disappears. In this vein, Lucas 
(1978, p. 354) argued that involuntary unemployment is not a fact that needs to be 
explained, but rather a theoretical construct Keynes introduced in the hope it would be 
helpful in explaining fluctuations in measured unemployment. 
 
In line with these ideas, new classical economists have attempted to reconcile 
macroeconomic phenomena such as inflation and unemployment, and the empirical 
observed trade-off between the two measured by the Phillips’ curve, with a Walrasian 
notion of market clearing. Early models, such as Lucas and Rapping (1969) and Lucas 
(1972) stressed the idea that incomplete information regarding the money supply may 
cause business fluctuations. Later real business cycle models (such as Kydland and 
Prescott (1982)) looked at technology shocks to explain cyclical behavior. Thus, an 
important difference between the Lucas-Rapping approach and early real business cycle 
models is that the former, but not the latter, introduces frictions to explain business 
cycles. With these new classical models, the concept of the representative agent 
(consumer, firm or producer/consumer agent) became widely used in modern 
macroeconomics. In its most extreme form, the economy as a whole is represented as if it 
were the outcome of a single individual’s decision problem. The possible differences 
between individual and aggregate economic behavior are thereby assumed away.  
 
Economists who were oriented towards Keynesian ideas thought that there is an 
involuntary, non-transient component in observed unemployment figures. Many New 
Keynesian contributions therefore try to reconcile the notion of involuntary 
unemployment with a notion of market equilibrium. 
 
A first approach considers the question how to incorporate the notion of price stickiness, 
especially concerning money wages, with the traditional theory of demand and supply. 
This issue was first studied by Clower (1965). He emphasized that because of the 
interdependence of markets, demand and supply curves on all markets are affected if 
money wages are fixed. If prices are restrained from bringing about market clearing 
allocations, then, other variables have to bring about some kind of fixed-price 
equilibrium. Clower (1965) and Leijonhufvud (1968) set out a research program studying 
the existence of fixed-price equilibria and their properties. The resulting equilibrium 
notion and the properties of such fixprice equilibria were formulated by Barro and 
Grossman (1971), Drèze (1975) and Benassy (1975) among others. The idea of this 
literature is that agents express their demands on the basis of market prices and perceived 
quantity constraints. These models have microfoundations in the sense that they are based 
on decision-making individuals and a notion of equilibrium. Moreover, it turned out that 
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the fixprice models capture quite a number of ideas associated with Keynesian 
economics. By means of these alternative equilibrium notions, involuntary 
unemployment could be regarded as an equilibrium phenomenon in which optimizing 
households face a quantity constraint on the amount of labor they can supply. Also, the 
Keynesian notions of effective demand and the multiplier were reformulated within the 
new models. Finally, the models provided arguments for demand policies by the 
government. Of course, from a market clearing perspective, these fixprice models are 
unsatisfactory as they do not explain why (rational) individuals do not propose changes to 
the terms of trade at which they exchange. Clearly, if prices are fixed at no market 
clearing levels, some agents in the economy can mutually benefit by exchanging at 
different prices, and therefore have an incentive to propose changes in prices. A literature 
on small menu cost appeared arguing that introducing a very small cost for economic 
agents to change prices may result in large fluctuations in aggregate output (cf., Mankiw, 
1985). 
 
Another approach New Keynesian economists followed is to incorporate the literature on 
imperfect competition in macroeconomic models. Hart (1982), Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987), Kiyotaki (1988) and d'Aspremont et al. (1990) are among the pioneering articles 
in this area. These models can explain why aggregate output is below the optimal full 
employment output level. Unemployment can be involuntary when there is imperfect 
competition in the labor market. 
 
A third approach to explain non-competitive wages is to introduce some type of 
informational problem as in the literature on efficiency wages. The basic idea of this 
literature is that the average labor productivity is positively related to the wage a firm 
offers. Firms may set wages above the competitive level in order to induce employees to 
work harder and they therefore may be unwilling to lower their wage offers (cf., Yellen, 
1984 and Lindbeck and Snower, 1987).  
 
Yet, another approach relies on coordination failures formally analyzed in terms of 
multiple equilibria (cf., Bryant (1983), Roberts (1987)). Cooper and John (1988) point 
out that many new Keynesian models are based on strategic complementarities between 
agents’ actions, i.e., these models do not rely on an assumption that prices cannot adjust 
to their market equilibrium values. When strategic complementarity exists, there may be 
multiple equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked. Agents may then find themselves in a ‘bad’ 
equilibrium, but individually they cannot benefit by deviating to another choice. They 
call this a ‘coordination failure’  
 
There is a parallel between the coordination failures literature and the overlapping 
generations general equilibrium literature (see, e.g., Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 
(1986)). The latter literature views the economy as a process without definite end that is 
such that what happens today is underdetermined as it depends on what people expect to 
happen tomorrow, which in turn depends on what people expect to happen the day after 
tomorrow, etc. In such a world, there is a continuum of equilibria. Geanakoplos and 
Polemarchakis (1986) show that depending on how this indeterminacy is solved, i.e., 
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which variables are chosen to be exogenously determined, classical or Keynesian 
oriented conclusions may be derived. 
 
Work on all these different models has resulted in a shared methodology of how to go 
about building macroeconomic models. The traditional distinction in macroeconomics 
between Keynesian and classical economists is disappearing and a common methodology 
is surfacing. Economists share the understanding that the ultimate question that matters is 
how well markets function. The differences in importance attached to various market 
frictions are more a matter of degree than of fundamental divergence between different 
methodologies. The nature of what used to be macroeconomic theory has undergone 
dramatic changes alongside these developments. Traditional macroeconomic issues such 
as how to explain the business cycle or how to account for inflation are now studied using 
the same tools and techniques as those that are used in microeconomics. Along these 
lines, and by using the assumption of the representative agent, modern macroeconomics 
has assumed away the heterogeneity that may exist at the individual level. Lucas’s 
prediction that we may soon simply speak of economic theory, instead of separate 
microeconomic and macroeconomic theories, has turned out to be fairly accurate (cf., 
Lucas, 1987, pp. 107-8). Somewhat paradoxically, one may say that the modern 
economist who still is a “hard line microeconomist” is now called a macroeconomist.  
 
 
Rationality, Equilibrium and Expectations 
  
The efforts attempting to create a microfoundations for macroeconomics have resulted in 
a more unified approach of doing economic theory. The approaches discussed so far (also 
Keynesian oriented models) all postulate rational behavior on the part of economic agents 
and some notion of equilibrium. If expectations are important, it is postulated that agents’ 
expectations concerning important variables coincide with the model’s predicted values 
concerning these same variables. This assumption concerning agents’ expectations have 
been termed “rational expectations” (cf., Muth, 1961). 
 
Parallel to the microfoundations literature, a literature questioning the eductive 
justifications for the notions of equilibrium and rational expectations emerged. This 
literature on the foundations of game theory basically argued that if we assume that 
agents (players) are rational and that their rationality and the model (game) in which they 
operate is assumed to be common knowledge, then it is not implied that these agents will 
play according to an equilibrium of the game. Fundamental papers in this respect are 
Bernheim (1984) and Peirce (1984), among others. These and other papers show that a 
much weaker notion, named (correlated) rationalizability, can be derived from 
assumptions regarding common knowledge of the rationality of players. 
 
On the basis of this literature, Guesnerie (1992) argues that the notion of rational 
expectations should be regarded as an equilibrium notion that is also not solely based on 
postulates regarding the rational behavior of individual players. It is rational for 
individual players to have “rational expectations” if other players have these very same 
“rational expectations”, but not necessarily otherwise. As the notion of rational 
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expectations is essentially an equilibrium or consistency notion, it suffers from the same 
drawbacks that it is not implied by the individual rationality assumptions that players will 
form rational expectations. 
 
Another literature (see, e.g., several essays in Frydman and Phelps (1983) and, for 
example, Bray and Savin (1986)) studies the question whether in a decentralized 
economy economic agents may learn over time to have expectations that are consistent 
with those that are assumed by the rational expectations hypothesis. The general 
conclusion of this literature is that due to the feedback from expectations to economic 
behavior, the outcomes of an economic model with learning agents do not converge to 
the rational expectations solution. 
 
It then follows that the microfoundations literature mentioned so far has not really 
succeeded in deriving all macroeconomic propositions from fundamental hypotheses on 
the behavior of individual agents. The requirements of methodological individualism 
have thus not been satisfied by the microfoundations literature that has pre-dominantly 
presumed that individuals behave rationally (cf., Janssen, 1993).  
 
 
Non-mainstream Approaches to Microfoundations of Macroeconomics 
 
Apart from a long-lasting debate in the mainstream literature, the term 
‘microfoundations’ has also stimulated work by other economists and they have provided 
their views on the relation between microeconomics and macroeconomics. Horwitz 
(2000) provides an overview of the Austrian perspective where individual knowledge, 
prices as conveyers of information and subjective evaluations play important roles. 
Especially the essays in Hayek (1948) and his views on spontaneous order are important 
in this respect. It may seem then that macroeconomics is not an important term in the 
Austrian vocabulary. However, this is only partly true. From an Austrian perspective, an 
important question is, for example, what kind of monetary system will most likely 
preserve the communicative function of prices. Austrian economists have, as Horwitz 
shows, addressed such issues in a way that is compatible with methodological 
individualism. 
 
A post-Keynesian view of the economy holds that long-term expectations are largely 
determined by non-economic processes such as those determined by mass psychology. 
These expectations therefore should be regarded as exogenous to the economic model, 
rather than as endogenously determined as in the case of rational expectations. 
Interestingly, this post-Keynesian view comes close to the result that is established by 
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) in their overlapping generations general 
equilibrium model where they show that indeterminacy of equilibria implies that 
expectations concerning future market outcomes may be chosen exogenously. Important 
investment decisions are according to post-Keynesian economists, by their nature, long-
term decisions and these decisions are thus largely determined by the state of these long-
term expectations. This fundamental uncertainty requires a different decision theoretic 
approach than what is typically used by mainstream economics. Informally, some post-
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Keynesians have argued for the irreducibility of macroeconomic issues to purely 
microeconomic considerations where individuals’ actions are based on expected utility 
calculations (cf., Weintraub, 1979).  
 
 
Alternative Types of Microfoundations 
 
Most of the literature up to the 1990s discussing microfoundations of macroeconomics 
has focused on rationally behaving self-interested economic agents. More recently, 
attention has shifted to other forms of behavior. Using evolutionary mechanisms or 
learning, economists have studied the evolutionary foundations of equilibrium notions 
(cf., Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993)). Allowing agents to imitate best practices they 
observe around them, or choosing best replies to some adaptively formed expectations of 
what others will do, the literature shows that under some conditions concerning the 
dynamic process the economy will converge to equilibrium play. Early work in this 
direction by Schelling (1978) shows, as noted in the introduction to this entry, that macro 
phenomena such as racial segregation may be regarded as the unintended long-run 
outcome of the interactive effects of decisions of individual households to move into 
other neighborhoods. This literature is further reviewed in the entry on social interaction. 
 
Alternatively, economists (such as Fehr and Falk, 1999) have recently looked at the 
consequences of nonselfish preferences for macroeconomic outcomes. They consider 
preferences for fairness and reciprocity to be important in explaining why managers do 
not consider cutting employees’ wages. Wage cuts may be perceived as unfair and hostile 
and managers fear that they will be followed by hostile actions on the part of employees. 
This literature provides an alternative foundation for the downward rigidity of monetary 
wages and may start of a literature on behavioral macroeconomics. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The microfoundations literature has brought about many changes in economic theory. 
Macroeconomic theory in the form of studying the interplay of a few aggregate 
relationships is almost nonexistent nowadays. Instead, an extreme form of 
“microfoundations” is sometimes used in which the economy as a whole is represented in 
terms of a single agent decision problem. In this way, it is precluded from the analysis 
that emergent properties appear at the macro level that do not exist at the individual level 
as the micro and macro level simply coincide!  
 
Together with the many other models in the microfoundations literature reviewed in this 
entry we now see a wide spectrum of partly overlapping models dealing with different 
types of market frictions and market imperfections. Most of the literature before the 
1990s considers fairly traditional assumptions concerning individual behavior. More 
recent contributions in the area of behavioral economics and evolutionary models with 
(adaptively) learning individuals start to explore the implications of different behavioral 
assumptions at the individual level and to consider the macro implications. These models 
have the potential to analyze how macro phenomena may emergence from the interaction 
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between a heterogeneous set of individuals. Thereby, they may provide economic theory 
with a more plausible empirical underpinning, while sticking to the requirements of 
methodological individualism. 
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